Did Heidegger Talk to Husserl Again

Martin Heidegger (1889—1976)

Martin Heidegger is widely acknowledged to be i of the most original and of import philosophers of the 20^th century, while remaining ane of the most controversial.  His thinking has contributed to such diverse fields as phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), existentialism (Sartre, Ortega y Gasset), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), political theory (Arendt, Marcuse, Habermas), psychology (Dominate, Binswanger, Rollo May), and theology (Bultmann, Rahner, Tillich). His critique of traditional metaphysics and his opposition to positivism and technological world domination accept been embraced by leading theorists of postmodernity (Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard). On the other hand, his involvement in the Nazi movement has invoked a stormy debate.  Although he never claimed that his philosophy was concerned with politics, political considerations take come up to overshadow his philosophical piece of work.

Heidegger's main involvement was ontology or the study of being. In his key treatise, Existence and Time, he attempted to access being (Sein) past means of phenomenological analysis of human being (Dasein) in respect to its temporal and historical character. After the change of his thinking ("the plow"), Heidegger placed an emphasis on language equally the vehicle through which the question of being tin be unfolded. He turned to the exegesis of historical texts, especially of the Presocratics, simply also of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Hölderlin, and to poetry, architecture, technology, and other subjects. Instead of looking for a full clarification of the significant of beingness, he tried to pursue a kind of thinking which was no longer "metaphysical." He criticized the tradition of Western philosophy, which he regarded as nihilistic, for, as he claimed, the question of being as such was obliterated in it. He too stressed the nihilism of modern technological culture. Past going to the Presocratic starting time of Western thought, he wanted to echo the early Greek experience of existence, and then that the Westward could turn abroad from the expressionless end of nihilism and begin afresh. His writings are notoriously difficult. Existence and Time remains his most influential work.

Tabular array of Contents

1. Life and Works
2. Philosophy as Phenomenological Ontology
3. Dasein and Temporality
4. The Quest for the Meaning of Existence
5. Overcoming Metaphysics
6. From the First Beginning to the New Starting time
7. From Philosophy to Political Theory
8. Heidegger's Collected Works
   1. Published Writings, 1910-1976
   2. Lectures from Marburg and Freiburg, 1919-1944
   3. Private Monographs and Lectures, 1919-1967
   4. Notes and Fragments

1. Life and Works

Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889 in Messkirch in south-west Federal republic of germany to a Catholic family unit. His father worked as sexton in the local church building. In his early youth, Heidegger was being prepared for the priesthood. In 1903 he went to the high school in Konstanz, where the church building supported him with a scholarship, and and then, in 1906, he moved to Freiburg. His interest in philosophy first arose during his high school studies in Freiburg when, at the age of seventeen, he read Franz Brentano's book entitled On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle. By his own business relationship, it was this work that inspired his life-long quest for the meaning of being. In 1909, after completing the loftier school, he became a Jesuit novice, but was discharged within a month for reasons of health. He then entered Freiburg Academy, where he studied theology. Still, because of wellness problems and peradventure because of a lack of a potent spiritual vocation, Heidegger left the seminary in 1911 and broke off his training for the priesthood. He took up studies in philosophy, mathematics, and natural sciences. It was also at that time that he first became influenced past Edmund Husserl. He studied Husserl'south Logical Investigations. In 1913 he completed a doctorate in philosophy with a dissertation on The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism nether the direction of the neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert.

The outbreak of the First Globe War interrupted Heidegger's academic career only briefly. He was conscripted into the army, but was discharged later two months because of health reasons. Hoping to take over the chair of Catholic philosophy at Freiburg, Heidegger at present began to work on a habilitation thesis, the required qualification for instruction at the university. His thesis, Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Categories and Meaning, was completed in 1915, and in the same year he was appointed a Privatdozent, or lecturer. He taught mostly courses in Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, and regarded himself equally standing in the service of the Catholic world-view. Nevertheless, his turn from theology to philosophy was before long to be followed by some other turn.

In 1916, Heidegger became a junior colleague of Edmund Husserl when the latter joined the Freiburg faculty. The post-obit twelvemonth, he married Thea Elfride Petri, a Protestant student who had attended his courses since the fall of 1915. His career was over again interrupted past armed services service in 1918. He served for the last ten months of the state of war, the last three of those in a meteorological unit of measurement on the western front. Within a few weeks of his return to Freiburg, he appear his intermission with the "arrangement of Catholicism" (January ix, 1919), got appointed as Husserl's assistant (January 21, 1919), and began lecturing in a new, insightful way (February vii, 1919). His lectures on phenomenology and his creative interpretations of Aristotle would now earn him a wide acclamation. And yet, Heidegger did not but become Husserl's faithful follower. In particular, he was not absorbed by the later developments of Husserl'south thought—by his neo-Kantian turn towards transcendental subjectivity and even less by his Cartesianism—but continued to value his earlier piece of work, Logical Investigations. Laboring over the question of things themselves, Heidegger soon began a radical reinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenology.

In 1923, with the back up of Paul Natorp, Heidegger was appointed associate professor at Marburg University. Betwixt 1923 and 1928, he enjoyed there the most fruitful years of his entire teaching career. His students testified to the originality of his insight and the intensity of his philosophical questioning. Heidegger extended the scope of his lectures, and taught courses on the history of philosophy, fourth dimension, logic, phenomenology, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Leibniz. However, he had published nothing since 1916, a gene that threatened his future bookish career. Finally, in February 1927, partly because of administrative pressure level, his cardinal but also unfinished treatise, Existence and Fourth dimension, appeared. Within a few years, this book was recognized equally a truly epoch-making piece of work of 20^thursday century philosophy. It earned Heidegger, in the fall of 1927, total professorship at Marburg, and one year later, later on Husserl'south retirement from teaching, the chair of philosophy at Freiburg University. Although Being and Time is defended to Husserl, upon its publication Heidegger's departure from Husserl'due south phenomenology and the differences betwixt two philosophers became apparent. In 1929, his side by side published works—"What is Metaphysics?," "On the Essence of Basis," and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics—further revealed how far Heidegger had moved from neo-Kantianism and phenomenology of consciousness to his own phenomenological ontology.

Heidegger'southward life entered a problematic and controversial phase with Hitler's rising to power. In September 1930, Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Political party (NSDAP) became the second largest party in Germany, and on Jan 30, 1933 Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany. Up to then virtually apolitical, Heidegger now became politically involved. On April 21, 1933, he was elected rector of the University of Freiburg by the faculty. He was plainly urged by his colleagues to get a candidate for this politically sensitive post, as he after claimed in an interview with Der Spiegel, to avert the danger of a political party functionary beingness appointed. Simply he also seemed to believe that he could steer the Nazi movement in the right direction. On May 3, 1933, he joined the NSDAP, or Nazi, party. On May 27, 1933, he delivered his inaugural rectoral accost on "The Self-Exclamation of the German University." The ambiguous text of this speech has often been interpreted as an expression of his back up for Hitler'south regime. During his tenure equally rector he produced a number of speeches in the Nazi cause, such as, for instance, "Annunciation of Support for Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State" delivered in November 1933. There is little doubtfulness that during that time, Heidegger placed the keen prestige of his scholarly reputation at the service of National Socialism, and thus, willingly or non, contributed to its legitimization among his fellow Germans. And yet, merely ane year later, on April 23, 1934, Heidegger resigned from his function and took no further part in politics. His rectoral accost was found incompatible with the political party line, and its text was eventually banned by the Nazis. Because he was no longer involved in the party's activities, Heidegger's membership in the NSDAP became a mere formality. Certain restrictions were put on his freedom to publish and nourish conferences. In his lecture courses of the belatedly 1930s and early 1940s, and especially in the course entitled Hölderlin's Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rein" (Hölderlin'south Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine") originally presented at the University of Freiburg during the winter semester of 1934/35, he expressed covert criticism of Nazi credo. He came under assault of Ernst Krieck, semi-official Nazi philosopher. For some fourth dimension he was under the surveillance of the Gestapo. His final humiliation came in 1944, when he was declared the most "expendable" member of the faculty and sent to the Rhine to dig trenches. Post-obit Federal republic of germany'southward defeat in the Second World War, Heidegger was defendant of Nazi sympathies. He was forbidden to teach and in 1946 was dismissed from his chair of philosophy. The ban was lifted in 1949.

The 1930s are not only marked by Heidegger's controversial involvement in politics, only also by a modify in his thinking which is known every bit "the turn" (die Kehre). In his lectures and writings that followed "the turn," he became less systematic and frequently more obscure than in his primal work, Being and Time. He turned to the exegesis of philosophical and literary texts, especially of the Presocratics, only also of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Hölderlin, and makes this his way of philosophizing. A recurring theme of that time was "the essence of truth." During the decade between 1931 and 1940, Heidegger offered v courses under this championship. His preoccupation with the question of linguistic communication and his fascination with poesy were expressed in lectures on Hörderlin which he gave between 1934 and 1936. Towards the end of 1930s and the showtime of 1940s, he taught five courses on Nietzsche, in which he submitted to criticism the tradition of western metaphysics, described by him as nihilistic, and made allusions to the absurdity of war and the bestiality of his contemporaries. Finally, his reflection upon the western philosophical tradition and an try to open a infinite for philosophizing outside it, brought him to an exam of Presocratic thought. In the course of lectures entitled An Introduction to Metaphysics, which was originally offered every bit a course of lectures in 1935, and can be seen equally a bridge betwixt earlier and later on Heidegger, the Presocratics were no longer a subject field of mere passing remarks as in Heidegger's before works. The grade was not almost early Greek thought, yet the Presocratics became there the pivotal center of give-and-take. It is clear that with the evolution of Heidegger'south thinking in the 1930s, they gained in importance in his work. During the 1940s, in addition to giving courses on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Heidegger lectured extensively on Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus.

During the terminal three decades of his life, from the mid 1940s to the mid 1970s, Heidegger wrote and published much, simply in comparing to before decades, there was no significant alter in his philosophy. In his insightful essays and lectures, such as "What are Poets for?" (1946), "Letter on Humanism" (1947), "The Question Concerning Technology" (1953), "The Mode to Language" (1959), "Time and Being" (1962), and "The Terminate of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (1964), he addressed different issues concerning modernity, labored on his original philosophy of history—the history of beingness—and attempted to clarify his way of thinking after "the turn". Nigh of his fourth dimension was divided between his domicile in Freiburg, his second study in Messkirch, and his mount hut in the Black Woods. Simply he escaped provincialism by being frequently visited by his friends (including, among the others, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, the physicist Werner Heisenberg, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann, the psychologist Ludwig Binswanger) and by traveling more widely than always before. He lectured on "What is Philosophy?" at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1955, and on "Hegel and the Greeks" at Aix-en-Provence in 1957, and besides visited Hellenic republic in 1962 and 1967. In 1966, Heidegger attempted to justify his political involvement during the Nazi regime in an interview with Der Spiegel entitled "Only God Can Save Us". One of his last didactics stints was a seminar on Parmenides that he gave in Zähringen in 1973. Heiddegger died on May 26, 1976, and was buried in the churchyard in Messkirch. He remained intellectually active up until the very end, working on a number of projects, including the massive Gesamtausgabe, the consummate edition of his works.

2. Philosophy as Phenomenological Ontology

In social club to understand Heidegger's philosophy before "the turn", let u.s.a. first briefly consider his indebtedness to Edmund Husserl. As it has been mentioned, Heidegger was interested in Husserl from his early on student years at the University of Freiburg when he read Logical Investigations. After, when Husserl accepted a chair at Freiburg, Heidegger became his assistant. His debt to Husserl cannot exist disregarded. Not merely is Beingness and Fourth dimension dedicated to Husserl, but also Heidegger acknowledges in information technology that without Husserl's phenomenology his ain investigation would not have been possible. How and so is Heidegger'southward philosophy related to the Husserlian program of phenomenology?

By "phenomenology" Husserl himself had always meant the science of consciousness and its objects; this cadre of sense pervades the development of this concept equally eidetic, transcendental or constructive throughout his works. Following the Cartesian tradition, he saw the footing and the accented starting indicate of philosophy in the subject field. The procedure of bracketing is essential to Husserl'southward "phenomenological reduction"—the methodological procedure by which we are led from "the natural attitude," in which we are involved in the actual world and its affairs, to "the phenomenological attitude," in which the analysis and detached description of the content of consciousness is possible. The phenomenological reduction helps us to gratuitous ourselves from prejudices and secure the purity of our detachment every bit observers, so that we tin encounter "things every bit they are in themselves" independently of whatsoever presuppositions. The goal of phenomenology for Husserl is then a descriptive, discrete analysis of consciousness, in which objects, as its correlates, are constituted.

What right does Husserl have to insist that the original style of encounter with beings, in which they appear to us as they are equally things in themselves, is the meet of consciousness purified by phenomenological reduction and its objects? "Whence and how is it adamant what must be experienced as the 'things themselves' in accordance with the principle of phenomenology?" These are pressing questions which Heidegger might well accept asked. Maybe because of his reverence for Husserl, he does non subject him to direct criticism in his fundamental work. Nevertheless, Being and Time is itself a powerful critique of the Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger there gives attending to many different modes in which we exist and encounter things. He analyses the structures constitutive of things not just as they are encountered in the detached, theoretical attitude of consciousness, simply besides in daily life as "utensils" (Zuhandene) or in special moods, specially in anxiety (Angst). What is more, he exhibits there the structures that are constitutive of the detail kind of beingness which is the human beingness and which he calls "Dasein." For Heidegger, it is not pure consciousness in which beings are originally constituted. The starting point of philosophy for him is not consciousness, but Dasein in its beingness.

The cardinal problem for Husserl is the problem of constitution: How is the world as phenomenon constituted in our consciousness? Heidegger takes the Husserlian trouble one footstep farther. Instead of asking how something must be given in consciousness in lodge to be constituted, he asks: "What is the mode of beingness of that beingness in which the earth constitutes itself?" In a letter of the alphabet to Husserl dated October 27, 1927, he states that the question of Dasein'due south being cannot be evaded, as far equally the problem of constitution is concerned. Dasein is that being in which any being is constituted. Further, the question of Dasein'southward being directs him to the problem of being in general. The "universal problem of being," he says in the same letter, "refers to that which constitutes and to that which is constituted." While far from being dependent upon Husserl, Heidegger finds in his thought an inspiration leading him to the theme which has continued to depict his attending since his early on years: the question of the meaning of existence.

Phenomenology thus receives in Heidegger a new meaning. He conceives it more broadly, and more etymologically, than Husserl, equally "letting what shows itself to exist seen from itself, just every bit it shows from itself." Husserl applies the term "phenomenology" to a whole philosophy. Heidegger takes it rather to designate a method. Since in Being and Fourth dimension philosophy is described as "ontology" and has being as its theme, it cannot prefer its method from any of the actual sciences. For Heidegger the method of ontology is phenomenology. "Phenomenology," he says, "is the way of access to what is to get the theme of ontology." Beingness is to be grasped by means of the phenomenological method. However, being is e'er the being of a being, and accordingly, it becomes accessible only indirectly through some existing entity. Therefore, "phenomenological reduction" is necessary. One must straight oneself toward an entity, but in such a fashion that its being is thereby brought out. Information technology is Dasein which Heidegger chooses as the particular entity to access beingness. Hence, as the basic component of his phenomenology, Heidegger adopts the Husserlian phenomenological reduction, just gives it a completely dissimilar meaning.

To sum up, Heidegger does not base his philosophy on consciousness as Husserl did. For him the phenomenological or theoretical attitude of consciousness, which Husserl makes the core of his doctrine, is only one possible style of that which is more than primal, namely, Dasein's being. Although he agrees with Husserl that the transcendental constitution of the world cannot be unveiled past naturalistic or physical explanations, in his view it is not a descriptive analysis of consciousness that leads to this terminate, simply the assay of Dasein. Phenomenology for him is not a descriptive, detached assay of consciousness. It is a method of access to being. For the Heidegger of Existence and Time, philosophy is phenomenological ontology which takes its divergence from the analysis of Dasein.

3. Dasein and Temporality

In everyday German language the give-and-take "Dasein" ways life or existence. The substantive is used by other High german philosophers to denote the existence of whatever entity. All the same, Heidegger breaks the discussion downwards to its components "Da" and "Sein," and gives to information technology a special meaning which is related to his reply to the question of who the homo being is. He relates this question to the question of existence. Dasein, that being which nosotros ourselves are, is distinguished from all other beings by the fact that it makes issue of its ain being. It stands out to being. As Da-sein, it is the site, "Da", for the disclosure of being, "Sein."

Heidegger'due south fundamental analysis of Dasein from Being and Fourth dimension points to temporality equally the primordial significant of Dasein's being. Dasein is essentially temporal. Its temporal character is derived from the tripartite ontological structure: beingness, thrownness, and fallenness by which Dasein's being is described. Existence means that Dasein is potentiality-for-being (Seinkönnen); it projects its being upon various possibilities. Existence represents thus the miracle of the future. Then, as thrownness, Dasein always finds itself already in a certain spiritual and material, historically conditioned surround; in short, in the earth, in which the infinite of possibilities is always somehow limited. This represents the phenomenon of the past as having-been. Finally, every bit fallenness, Dasein exists in the midst of beings which are both Dasein and not Dasein. The run across with those beings, "being-alongside" or "existence-with" them, is made possible for Dasein by the presence of those beings within-the-world. This represents the primordial phenomenon of the present. Accordingly, Dasein is not temporal for the mere reason that it exists "in fourth dimension," simply considering its very existence is rooted in temporality: the original unity of the hereafter, the past and the present. Temporality cannot exist identified with ordinary clock time – with just being at one point in time, at one "At present" after another—which for Heidegger is a derivative phenomenon. Neither does Dasein'south temporality have the simply quantitative, homogeneous character of the concept of time found in natural science. It is the miracle of original time, of the time which "temporalizes" itself in the course of Dasein's beingness. Information technology is a movement through a world every bit a space of possibilities. The "going dorsum" to the possibilities that have been (the by) in the moment of thrownness, and their projection in the resolute movement "coming towards" (the hereafter) in the moment of being, which both take place in "being with" others (the present) in the moment of fallenness, provide for the original unity of the future, the past, and the present which constitutes accurate temporality.

As authentically temporal, Dasein as potentiality-for-being comes towards itself in its possibilities of beingness past going back to what has been; it always comes towards itself from out of a possibility of itself. Hence, it comports itself towards the hereafter by always coming back to its past; the past which is not merely by simply still effectually as having-been. But in this "going back" to what it has been which is constitutive together with "coming towards" and "being with" for the unity of Dasein's temporality, Dasein hands down to itself its own historical "heritage," namely, the possibilities of being that accept come downwardly to it. As authentically temporal, Dasein is thus authentically historical. The repetition of the possibilities of existence, of that which has been, is for Heidegger constitutive for the phenomenon of original history which is rooted in temporality.

iv. The Quest for the Meaning of Being

Throughout his long bookish career, Heidegger was preoccupied with the question of the significant of being. His first conception of this question goes as far dorsum as his high school studies, during which he read Franz Brentano's volume On the Manifold Meaning of Beingness in Aristotle. In 1907, the seventeen-year-quondam Heidegger asked: "If what-is is predicated in manifold meanings, and then what is its leading fundamental significant? What does beingness mean?" The question of being, unanswered at that fourth dimension, becomes the leading question of Beingness and Time xx years later. Surveying the long history of the pregnant attributed to "being," Heidegger notes that in the philosophical tradition it has generally been presupposed that being is at once the nearly universal concept, the concept indefinable in terms of other concepts, and the self-evident concept. In brusk, it is a concept that is more often than not taken for granted. However, Heidegger claims that fifty-fifty though we seem to understand existence, its meaning is notwithstanding veiled in darkness. Therefore, we demand to recapitulate the question of the meaning of beingness.

In accordance with the method of philosophy which he employs in his key treatise, before attempting to provide an reply to the question of being in full general, Heidegger sets out to answer the question of the being of the detail kind of entity that is the man existence, which he calls Dasein. The brilliant phenomenological descriptions of Dasein's existence-in-the-world, especially Dasein's everydayness and resoluteness toward death, have attracted many readers with interests related to existential philosophy, theology, and literature. The basic concepts such as temporality, agreement, historicity, repetition, and authentic or inauthentic existence were carried over into and farther explored in his later works.  Still, from the point of view of the quest for the meaning of being, Being and Time was a failure and remained unfinished. As Heidegger himself admitted in his later essay, "Letter on Humanism" (1946), the third division of its first role, entitled "Fourth dimension and Beingness," was held dorsum "because thinking failed in adequate saying of the turning and did not succeed with the assist of the language of metaphysics." The second part also remained unwritten.

"The turn" (Kehre) that occurs in the 1930'due south is the change in Heidegger'south thinking mentioned above.  The consequence of "the turn" is not the abandoning of the leading question of Being and Time.  Heidegger stresses the continuity of his thought over the class of the alter. Nevertheless, every bit "everything is reversed," even the question apropos the meaning of Being is reformulated in Heidegger's later piece of work. It becomes a question of the openness, that is, of the truth, of being. Furthermore, since the openness of beingness refers to a situation within history, the most of import concept in the later Heidegger becomes the history of being.

For a reader unacquainted with Heidegger's idea, both the "question of the significant of being" and the expression "history of existence" sound foreign. In the first place, such a reader may argue that when something is said to be, at that place is aught expressed which the world "Being" could properly denote. Therefore, the word "being" is a meaningless term and the Heideggerian quest for the meaning of being is in general a misunderstanding. Secondly, the reader may also think that the being of Heidegger is no more likely to have a history than the beingness of Aristotle, and so the "history of being" is a misunderstanding too. Nevertheless, Heidegger'southward chore is precisely to evidence that there is a meaningful concept of beingness. "We sympathise the 'is' we use in speaking," he claims, "although we do not comprehend information technology conceptually." Therefore, Heidegger asks: Can being then be idea? We can remember of beings: a table, my desk, the pencil with which I am writing, the schoolhouse building, a heavy storm in the mountains . . . only existence? If the being whose meaning Heidegger seeks seems then elusive, most like no-affair, it is considering information technology is not an entity. It is not something; it is not a being. "Being is essentially different from a being, from beings." The "ontological difference," the stardom betwixt being (das Sein) and beings (das Seiende), is fundamental for Heidegger. The forgetfulness of being that, co-ordinate to him, occurs in the grade of Western philosophy amounts to the oblivion of this stardom.

The formulation of the history of being is of key importance in Heidegger'south thought. Already in Being and Time its idea is foreshadowed as "the devastation of the history of ontology." In Heidegger's later writings the story is considerably recast and called the "history of being" (Seinsgeschichte). The get-go of this story, as told past Heidegger especially in the Nietzsche lectures, is the stop, the completion of philosophy by its dissolution into item sciences and nihilism—questionlessness of being, a dead end into which the West has run. Heidegger argues that the question of being would still provide a stimulus to the research of Plato and Aristotle, simply it was precisely with them that the original experience of being of the early Greeks was covered over. The fateful upshot was followed by the gradual slipping away of the distinction between being and beings. Described variously past different philosophers, being was reduced to a being: to thought in Plato, substantia and actualitas in Medieval philosophy, objectivity in modern philosophy, and volition to power in Nietzsche and contemporary idea. The task which the later Heidegger sets before himself is then to make a way back into the primordial beginning, so that the "expressionless end" can be replaced past a new offset. And since the primordial start of western idea lies in ancient Greece, in club to solve the problems of contemporary philosophy and contrary the course of modern history, Heidegger ultimately turns for assistance to the Presocratics, the kickoff western thinkers.

v. Overcoming Metaphysics

For the later Heidegger, "western philosophy," in which in that location occurs forgetfulness of beingness, is synonymous with "the tradition of metaphysics." Metaphysics inquires almost the being of beings, merely in such a manner that the question of beingness as such is disregarded, and existence itself is obliterated. The Heideggerian "history of being" can thus be seen as the history of metaphysics, which is the history of being'south oblivion. However, looked at from another angle, metaphysics is also the way of thinking that looks beyond beings toward their ground or basis. Each metaphysics aims at the fundamentum absolutum, the ground of such a metaphysics which presents itself indubitably. In Descartes, for case, the fundamentum absolutum is attained through the "Cogito" argument. Cartesian metaphysics is characterized by subjectivity considering it has its ground in the self-certain subject. Furthermore, metaphysics is not merely the philosophy which asks the question of the being of beings. At the end of philosophy—i.e., in our present age where there occurs the dissolution of philosophy into particular sciences—the sciences nevertheless speak of the being of what-is as a whole. In the wider sense of this term, metaphysics is thus, for Heidegger, any discipline which, whether explicitly or not, provides an answer to the question of the being of beings and of their ground. In medieval times such a discipline was scholastic philosophy, which defined beings as entia creatum (created things) and provided them with their ground in ens perfectissimum (the perfect being), God. Today the discipline is modern engineering, through which the contemporary human being existence establishes himself in the world by working on it in the various modes of making and shaping. Technology forms and controls the human being position in today'due south globe. It masters and dominates beings in diverse ways.

"In stardom from mastering beings, the thinking of thinkers is the thinking of being." Heidegger believes that early on Greek thinking is not yet metaphysics. Presocratic thinkers ask the question concerning the being of beings, but in such a way that being itself is laid open. They feel the being of beings as the presencing (Anwesen) of what is nowadays (Anwesende). Being equally presencing means indelible in unconcealment, disclosing. Throughout his later works Heidegger uses several words in order rightly to convey this Greek experience. What-is, what is present, the unconcealed, is "what appears from out of itself, in appearing shows itself , and in this self-showing manifests." It is the "emerging arising, the unfolding that lingers." He describes this feel with the Greek words phusis (emerging dominance) and alêtheia (unconcealment). He attempts to show that the early Greeks did not "objectify" beings (they did not endeavour to reduce them to an object for the thinking field of study), but they let them exist as they were, as self-showing rising into unconcealment. They experienced the phenomenality of what is present, its radiant self-showing. The departure of Western philosophical tradition from concern with what is present in presencing, from this unique experience that astonished the Greeks, has had profound theoretical and practical consequences.

According to Heidegger, the experience of what is present in presencing signifies the true, unmediated feel of "the things themselves" (die Sache selbst). We may call up that the telephone call to "the things themselves" was included in the Husserlian program of phenomenology. By means of phenomenological description Husserl attempted to arrive at pure phenomena and to depict beings just as they were given independently of whatsoever presuppositions. For Heidegger, this attempt has, however, a serious drawback. Like the tradition of modernistic philosophy preceding him, Husserl stood at the basis of subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity or consciousness was for him "the sole absolute being." It was the presupposition that had not been deemed for in his plan which aimed to be presuppositionless. Consequently, in Heidegger's view, the Husserlian endeavor to arrive at pure, unmediated phenomena fails. Husserl's phenomenology departs from the original phenomenality of beings and represents them in terms of the thinking subject as their presupposed basis. By contrast, Heidegger argues, for the Presocratics, beings are grounded in beingness as presencing. Being, all the same, is not a footing. To the early Greeks, being, unlimited in its dis-closure, appears as an abyss, the source of idea and wonder. Being calls everything into question, casts the human out of any habitual ground, and opens before him the mystery of existence.

The deviation of western philosophical tradition from what is present in presencing results in metaphysics. Heidegger believes that today'south metaphysics, in the form of applied science and the calculative thinking related to it, has become and so pervasive that there is no realm of life that is non bailiwick to its dominance. It imposes its technological-scientific-industrial character on homo beings, making it the sole criterion of the human sojourn on earth. Every bit it ultimately degenerates into ideologies and worldviews, metaphysics provides an answer to the question of the being of beings for gimmicky men and women, but skillfully removes from their lives the problem of their own beingness. Moreover, because its sway over contemporary human beings is and so powerful, metaphysics cannot be merely bandage aside or rejected. Whatever direct endeavour to do and then will only strengthen its concord. Metaphysics cannot be rejected, canceled or denied, but it can be overcome by demonstrating its nihilism. In Heidegger'south use of the term, "nihilism" has a very specific meaning. It refers to the forgetfulness of being. What remains unquestioned and forgotten in metaphysics is Being; hence, it is nihilistic.

According to Heidegger, Western humankind in all its relations with beings is sustained past metaphysics. Every historic period, every human epoch, no matter all the same unlike they may exist—

Greece afterwards the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity—has asserted a metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific human relationship to what-is every bit a whole. Metaphysics inquires most the being of beings, but it reduces beingness to a being; it does not call up of being as being. Insofar as beingness itself is obliterated in it, metaphysics is nihilism. The metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche. Consequently, Heidegger tries to demonstrate the nihilism of metaphysics in his business relationship of the history of being, which he considers as the history of being's oblivion. His effort to overcome metaphysics is non based on a mutual-sense positing of a different fix of values or the setting out of an culling worldview, but rather is related to his concept of history, the fundamental theme of which is the repetition of the possibilities for being. This repetition consists in thinking existence back to the primordial start of the West—to the early Greek experience of existence as presencing—and repeating this beginning, so that the Western world can begin anew.

6. From the Get-go Commencement to the New Start

Many scholars perceive something unique in the Greek offset of philosophy. It is commonly best-selling that Thales and his successors asked generalized questions apropos what is as a whole, and proposed general, rational answers which were no longer based on a theological ground. Even so, Heidegger does not associate the unique beginning with the alleged discovery of rationality and science. In fact, he claims that both rationality and science are afterwards developments, so that they cannot utilize to Presocratic thought. In his view, the Presocratics ask: "What are beings as such as a whole?" and they respond: aletheia—unconcealment. They feel beings in their phenomenality: as what is nowadays in presencing. But the later thought which begins with Plato and Aristotle is unable to go on upward with the kickoff. With Plato and Aristotle metaphysics begins and the history of being's oblivion originates.

The aim which the later Heidegger sets before himself is precisely to return to the original feel of beings in being that stands at the beginning of Western thought. This unmediated experience of beings in their phenomenality tin be variously described: what is present in presencing, the unconcealment of what is present, the original disclosure of beings. To repeat the primordial get-go more originally in its originality ways to bring us dorsum to the Presocratic experiences, to dis-close them, and to allow them be as they originally are. Just the repetition is not for the sake of the Presocratics themselves. Heidegger's work is non a mere antique, scholarly report of early Greek thinking, nor is it an affirmation of the long lost Greek way of life. It occurs within the perspective of nihilism and being's forgetfulness, both unknown to the Greeks, and has as a goal the future possibilities for being. It happens every bit the listening that opens itself out to the words of the Presocratics from our contemporary age, from the age of the world film and representation, the globe which is marked by the domination of technology and the oblivion of being. In the first beginning, the task of the Greeks was to ask the question "What are beings?," and hence to bring beings equally such as a whole to the beginning recognition and the most simple interpretation. In the finish, the task is to brand questionable what at the finish of a long tradition of philosophy-metaphysics has been forgotten. The new outset begins thus with the question of being.

From Being and Time (1927) where the question of the significant of being is start developed, simply still expressed in the language of metaphysics, to "Fourth dimension and Beingness" (1962) where an attempt to think being without regard to metaphysics is made, Heidegger goes full circle. Heidegger begins past request near the multiple meanings of being and ends up conceding its multiplicity and acknowledging that there are multiple determinations or meanings of beingness in which existence discloses itself in history. Nevertheless, in neither of these meanings does existence give itself fully. "Every bit it discloses itself in beings, being withdraws." There is an essential withdrawal of being. Therefore, the truth of existence is none of its particular historical determinations—idea, substantia, actualitas, objectivity or the will to power. The truth of being tin be defined as the openness, the free region which always out of sight provides the space of play for the different determinations of being and human epochs established in them. Information technology is that which is before bodily things and grants them a possibility of manifestation as what is present, ens creatum, and objects.

The truth of being, its openness, is for Heidegger not something which we can merely consider or think of. It is not our own production. It is where we always come to stand. We find ourselves thrown in a historically conditioned environs, in an epoch in which the conclusion apropos the prevailing interpretation of the existence of beingness is already fabricated for us. Notwithstanding, by asking the question of being, we tin can at least endeavor to costless ourselves from our historical conditioning. Heidegger'southward program expressed in "The Finish of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (1964) consists solely in the graphic symbol of thinking which does not attempt to boss, merely engages in disclosing and opening up what shows itself, emerges, and is manifest. When Heidegger urges u.s. to stand up in existence, he does not merely ask us to admit our own place in being's history, but to be hereafter-oriented and see the future in a unity with the past as having-been and the present. It means turning oneself into being in its disclosing withdrawal.

vii. From Philosophy to Political Theory

Heidegger never claimed that his philosophy was concerned with politics. Even so, there are certainly some political implications of his idea. He perceives the metaphysical civilisation of the West as a continuity. Information technology begins with Plato and ends with modernity, and the potency of science and applied science. He thus implies in the post-modernist fashion that Nazism and the atom bomb, Auschwitz and Hiroshima, accept been something like the "fulfillment" of the tradition of Western metaphysics and tries to distance himself from that tradition. He turns to the Presocratics in club to retrieve a pre-metaphysical mode of thought that would serve as a starting indicate for a new first. However, his chiliad vision of the essential history of the West and of western nihilism can be questioned. Modernity, whose development involves not simply a technological but too a social revolution, which sets individuals loose from religious and ethnic communities, from parishes and family bonds, and which affirms materialistic values, can be regarded as a radical departure from earlier classical and Christian traditions. Reverse to Heidegger's argument, rather than existence a mere continuity, the "essential" history of the West can then be seen as a history of radical transformations. Christianity challenges the classical globe, while assimilating some aspects of it, and is in turn challenged by modernity. Modernity overturns the ideas and values of the traditional (Christian and classical) culture of the West, and, one time it becomes global, leads to the erosion of nonwestern traditional cultures.

Under the cover of immense speculative depth and rich ontological vocabulary full of intricate wordplay (both which make his writings extremely hard to follow) Heidegger expresses a simple political vision. He is a revolutionary thinker who denies the traditional philosophical segmentation between theory and practise, and this is especially clear when he boldly declares in his Introduction to Metaphysics that "we have undertaken the great and lengthy task of demolishing a world that has grown old and of building information technology truly afresh". He wants to overturn the traditional civilization of the Due west and build it anew on the basis of earlier traditions in the proper name of being. Like other thinkers of modernity, he adopts a Eurocentric perspective and sees the revival of German society as a condition for the revival of Europe (or the West), and that of Europe every bit a condition for the revival of for the whole globe; like them, while rejecting God as an end, he attempts to fix made ends for human beings. Ultimately, in the famous interview with Der Spiegel, he expresses his disillusionment with his project and says: "Philosophy will not be able to bring near a direct change of the present state of the world . . . The greatness of what is to be thought is also great." Like beingness, which he describes as "disclosing self-concealing," after making a disclosure he withdraws; after stirring up a revolution, he leaves all its problems to others. He says: "only a God can still salve us," but the God for whom, in the absence of philosophical thought, he at present looks is conspicuously not that of the Christians or of any contemporary religion.

In the Spiegel interview Heidegger tells usa that in order to begin afresh, we demand to go to the "age-one-time" (i.east., pre-classical and pre-metaphysical) traditions of thought. He invokes the concept of the ancient polis. Yet, since he does non want to concern himself with the question of ethics (beyond proverb in the "Letter of Humanism" that the word "ethics appeared for the showtime time in the school of Plato" and thus implying that ethics does not retrieve the truth of beingness and is nihilistic), he does not consider the fact that even in pre-Platonic and pre-Socratic times a Greek polis was an ethical community, in which moral questions were raised and discussed. The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, the poems of Hesiod, and the tragedies of Sophocles, as well as the other ancient Greek texts, including the monumental political piece of work of Thucydides, the History of the Peloponnesian State of war, limited concerns with upstanding beliefs at both the private and community levels. Furthermore, the strength of Western civilisation, insofar as its roots tin can be traced to ancient Greece, is that from its beginning it was based on rationality, understood as free argue, and the affirmation of fundamental moral values. Whenever it turned to irrationality and moral relativism, as in Nazism and Communism, that culture was in decline. Therefore, Heidegger is likely to exist mistaken in his diagnosis of the ills of the contemporary order, and his solution to those ills seems to be wrong. Asking the question of existence (and, drawing our attention to this question is certainly his significant contribution) is an of import add-on to, simply never a replacement for asking moral questions in the spirit of rationality and freedom.

Heidegger claims that the man existence as Da-sein tin be understood as the "there" (Da) which existence (Sein) requires in social club to disclose itself. The homo being is the unique being whose being has the character of openness toward Existence. But men and women tin also turn away from existence, forget their truthful selves, and thus deprive themselves of their humanity. This is, in Heidegger'due south view, the state of affairs of gimmicky humans, who take replaced authentic questioning concerning their existence with set-made answers served up past ideologies, the mass media, and overwhelming applied science. Consequently, Heidegger attempts to bring today's men and women back to the question of being. At the beginning of the tradition of Western philosophy, the human being was defined as creature rationale, the brute endowed with reason. Since and so, reason has become an absolute value which through education brings about a gradual transformation of all spheres of human life. It is non more than reason in the modern sense of calculative thinking, Heidegger believes, that we need today, but more openness toward and more reflection on that which is nearest to usa—existence.

8. Heidegger's Nerveless Works

Heidegger'due south earlier publications and transcripts of his lectures are being brought out in Gesamtausgabe, the complete edition of his works. The Gesamtausgabe, which is not yet complete and projected to fill up virtually one hundred volumes, is published by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main. The series consists of four divisions: (I) Published Writings 1910-1976; (II) Lectures from Marburg and Freiburg, 1919-1944; (Iii) Individual Monographs and Lectures, 1919-1967; (IV) Notes and Fragments. Below in that location is a list of the collected works of Martin Heidegger. English translations and publishers are cited with each work translated into English.

a. Published Writings, 1910-1976

• Frühe Schriften (1912-16).
• Sein und Zeit (1927). Translated every bit Being and Fourth dimension by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).
• Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929). Translated every bit Kant and the Trouble of Metaphysics, by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana Academy Press, 1997).
• Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (1936-68). Translated as Elucidations of Hölderlin'due south Verse, past Keith Hoeller (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2000).
• Holzwege (1935-46).
  • "Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes." Translated equally "The Origin of the Work of Fine art," by Albert Hofstadter, in Verse, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), and in Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 1993).
  • "Die Zeit des Weltbildes." Translated every bit "The Age of the Earth Picture" by William Lovitt in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1977).
  • "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung."
  • "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'." Translated as "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead'" past William Lovitt in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.
  • "Wozu Dichter?." Translated as "What Are Poets For?" by Albert Hofstadter, in Poetry, Language, Thought.
  • "Der Spruch der Anaximander." Translated as "The Anaximander Fragment" past David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi in Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).
• Vol. I, Nietzsche I (1936-39). Translated every bit Nietzsche I: The Will to Power equally Art by David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979)
• Vol. II, Nietzsche II (1939-46). Translated as "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same" by David F. Krell in Nietzsche II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same (New York, Harper & Row, 1984).
• Vorträge und Aufsätze (1936-53).
  • "Die Frage nach der Technik." Translated every bit "The Question Apropos Technology" by William Lovitt in The Question Apropos Technology and Other Essays.
  • "Wissenschaft und Besinnung." Translated every bit "Science and Reflection" by William Lovitt in The Question Apropos Technology and Other Essays.
  • "Überwindung der Metaphysik." Translated every bit "Overcoming Metaphysics" by Joan Stambaugh in The End of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).
  • "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra." Translated as "Who is Nietzsche'due south Zarathustra?" by David F. Krell in Nietzsche II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Aforementioned.
  • "Bauen Wohnen Denken." Translated as "Building Habitation Thinking."
  • "Das Ding." Translated as "The Thing" by Albert Hofstadter, in Poesy, Language, Thought.
  • "…dichterisch wohnet der Mensch..." Translated as "…Poetically Man Dwells…" by Albert Hofstadter, in Poetry, Language, Thought.
  • "Logos." Translated as "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B l)" by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi in Early on Greek Thinking.
  • "Moira." Translated every bit "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)" by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi in Early Greek Thinking.
  • "Aletheia." Translated every bit "Aletheia (Heraclius, Fragment B 16)" by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi in Early on Greek Thinking.
• Was heisst Denken? (1951-52). Translated equally What Is Called Thinking? by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Greyness (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).
• Wegmarken (1919-58). Translated equally Pathmarks. Edited past William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 1998).
  • Contains: "Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews" (1919/21), "Phenomenology and Theology" (1927), "From the Last Marburg Lecture Course" (1928), "What is Metaphysics?" (1929), "On the Essence of Ground" (1929), "On the Essence of Truth" (1930), "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" (1931-1932, 1940), "On the Essence and Concept in Aristotle's Physics B i" (1939), "Postscript to 'What is Metaphysics?'" (1943); "Letter on Humanism" (1946), "Introduction to 'What is Metaphysics?'" (1949), "On the Question of Being" (1955), "Hegel and the Greeks" (1958), "Kant'south Thesis Well-nigh Being" (1961).
• Der Satz vom Grund (1955-56). Translated as The Principle of Reason by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Printing, 1991).
• Identität und Differenz (1955-57). Translated every bit Identity and Difference by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
• Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Translated equally On the Way to Language by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
• Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910-76).
• Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-64). Translated as On Fourth dimension and Being by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Contains: "Time and Being," "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," and "My Fashion to Phenomenology."
• Seminare (1951-73).
• Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (1910-1976).

b. Lectures from Marburg and Freiburg, 1919-1944

• Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie (winter semester, 1923-1924).
• Aristoteles: Rhetorik (summertime semester, 1924).
• Platon: Sophistes (winter semester, 1924-1925). Translated equally Plato's Sophist by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington, Indiana University Printing, 1997).
• Prolegomena zur Geschite des Zeitbegriffs (summer semester, 1925). Translated equally History of the Concept of Time by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana Academy Printing, 1985).
• Logik: Die frage nach der Wahrheit (winter semester 1925-1926).
• Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (summer semester 1926).
• Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas 5. Aquin bis Kant (winter semester 1926-1927).
• Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (summer semester 1927). Translated as The Basic Bug of Phenomonology past Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Printing, 1982).
• Phänomenologie Estimation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (wintertime semester 1927-1928). Translated as Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant'south Critique of Pure Reason by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana Academy Press, 1997).
• Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (summer semester, 1928). Translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana Academy Press, 1984).
• Einleitung in dice Philosophie (winter semester 1928-1929).
• Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart (summertime semester, 1929).
• Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit (winter semester, 1929-1930). Translated as The Key Concepts of Metaphysics by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
• Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in dice Philosophie (summertime semester, 1930).
• Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (winter semester, 1930-1931). Translated as Hegel'southward Phenomenology of Spirit by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana Academy Printing, 1988).
• Aristoteles: Metaphysik IX (summertime semester, 1931). Translated as Aristotle'south Metaphysics Theta ane-three On the Essence and Authenticity of Strength by Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
• Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet (wintertime semester, 1931-1932).
• Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) (summer semester, 1932).
• Sein und Wahrheit (winter semester, 1933-1934).
• Logik als dice Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache (summer semester, 1934).
• Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein" (winter semester, 1934-1935).
• Einführung in die Metaphysik (summer semester, 1935). Translated equally An Introduction to Metaphysics by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Oasis, Conn.: Yale Academy Press, 2000).
• Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen. (winter semester, 1935-1936). Translated as What Is a Matter by W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967).
• Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) (summertime semester, 1936). Translated as Schelling'southward Treatise on the Essence of Human Liberty by Joan Stambaugh, (Athens: Ohio University Printing, 1984).
• Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst (wintertime semester, 1936-1937). Translated equally Nietzsche I: The Will to Power equally Art by David F. Krell (New York, Harper & Row, 1979).
• Nietzsches Metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Dice ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen (summer semester, 1937). Translated as "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same" in Nietzsche Ii: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same by David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
• Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik" (winter semester, 1937-1938). Translated as Bones Questions of Philosophy by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Printing, 1982).
• Nietzsches Ii. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung (winter semester, 1938-1939).
• Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis (summer semester, 1939). Translated equally "The Volition to Power every bit Knowledge" in Nietzsche III: The Will to Power as Cognition and Metaphysics by Joan Stambaugh (New York, Harper & Row, 1987).
• Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus (2nd trimester, 1940).
• Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Zur erneuten auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische untersuchungen ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhaengenden Gegenstaende (1809) (first trimester, 1941).
• Nietzsches Metaphysik (1941-2). Einleitung in die Philosopie – Denken und Dichten (1944-5).
• Grundbegriffe (summer semester, 1941). Translated as Bones Concepts by Gary Aylesworth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
• Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken" (winter semester, 1941-1942).
• Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister" (summer semester, 1942). Translated every bit Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister" by William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).
• Parmenides (wintertime semester, 1942-1943). Translated as Parmenides by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, Indiana Academy Press, 1992).
• Heraklit. ane. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit). (summer semester, 1943); 2. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos (summer semester, 1944).
• Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (1919).
• Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (winter semester, 1919-1920).
• Phaenomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung (summertime semester, 1920).
• Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (summer semester, 1921).
• Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomeno-logische Forschung (winter semester, 1921-1922).
• Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik. (summertime semester, 1922).
• Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität (summer semester, 1923). Translated as Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity past John va Buren (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

c. Individual Monographs and Lectures, 1919-1967

• Der Begriff der Zeit (1924). Translated as The Concept of Time by William McNeill, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
• Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938). Translated as Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning) by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Printing, 1999).
• Besinnung.
• Metaphysik und Nihilismus. Die Überwindung derMetaphysik. Das Wesen des Nihilismus.
• Hegel. Dice Negativität. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel aus dem Ansatz in der Negativität (1938-1939, 1941). two Erläuterung der "Einleitung" zu Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes" (1942).
• Dice Geschichte des Seyns (1938-1940).
• Das Ereignis (1941)
• Wahrheitsfrage als Vorfrage. Die Aletheia: Die Erinnerung in den ersten Anfang; Entmachtung der Ousis (1937).
• Zu Hölderlin – Griechenlandreisen.
• Feldweg-Gespräche. (1944-1945)
• Bremer und Freiburger Vortraege.
• Vorträge Vom Wesen der Wahrheit Freiburg lecture (1930). Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes (1935).
• Gedachtes.
• Anmerkungen zu "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1936). Eine Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit" (1936). Laufende Anmerkungen zu Sein und Zeit (1936).
• Marburger Übungen. Auslegungen der Aristotelischen "physik".
• Leibniz-Übungen.

d. Notes and Fragments

• Vom Wesen der Sprache
• Übungen SS 1937. Neitzsches metaphysische Grundstellung. Sein und Schein (1937)
• Einübung in das Denken. Die metaphysischen Grundstellungen des abendländischen Denkens. Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft.
• Überlegungen II-VI.
• Überlegungen VII-Eleven.
• Überlegungen XII-Fifteen.

Writer Data

W. J. Korab-Karpowicz
E-mail: Sopot_Plato@hotmail.com
Anglo-American Academy of Prague
Czech Commonwealth

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Source: https://iep.utm.edu/heidegge/